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CONGRESS, SEPARATION OF POWERS,
AND STANDING
Michael E. Soliminet
ABSTRACT
Plaintiffs must satisfy certain standing requirements before
they may bring a civil action in federal court. Typically a
plaintiff must have been injured in particular way, the injury
must have been caused by the defendant's conduct, and it
must be capable of being redressed by the relief granted by
the court. This Article, a contribution to a symposium on
"Access to the Courts in the Roberts Era, " revisits these
requirements in light of (1) several cases decided in the early
years of the Roberts Court, (2) the new members of the Court,
and (3) the considerable and continuing scholarly debate
over the role of Congress in statutorily providing for
standing. Part 11 of the Article briefly sets out the standing
requirements. Part III addresses the views on standing of the
most recent additions to the Court, Chief Justice John
Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito, before they
joined the Court. Part IV addresses, in three sections, the
standing decisions of the initial Terms of the Roberts Court.
The first section of that part discusses and dismisses the
utility of a purely originalist approach to determining
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standing. The second section discusses recent cases that have
addressed the limitations separation of powers concerns
place on standing sought by taxpayers, or by states as
plaint iffs. The third section considers from various
perspectives Congress's role in providing for standing by
statute, and the appropriate response of federal courts in
applying those statutes. The article concludes in Part V by
addressing the likely future of standing in the Roberts Court
and in the Obama Presidency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The word "standing" appears nowhere in Article HII of the U.S.
Constitution, but the Supreme Court has held, in too many cases to
cite, that parties (particularly plaintiffs) must satisfy standing
requirements in order for their cases to be justiciable in federal court.
As then-Professor and later Judge William Fletcher has remarked, the
requirements have been the subject of so many cases, not to mention
so much academic commentary, that they are "numbingly familiar."'
The conventional three-part test is that to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement of Article J,2 the plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury in fact," one that is "fairly traceable" to the
actions of the defendant, and one that can be redressed by the relief
requested from the court.3
I William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988).
2 U.S. CONST. art. ff, § 2.
3E.g., Summers v. Earth island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); see also Sprint
Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Sen's., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2008); Lujan v. Defenders of
1024 Vol. 59:4
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In light of the flood of cases explicating and applying these
requirements, and an avalanche of academic commentary addressing
their provenance and desirability, what more can be said? Rather than
exhaustively address those cases and scholarship, this Article's goal is
more modest. It will revisit the standing requirements in their
doctrinal and institutional context. The focus will be on three factors:
the ascension in 2005 of Chief Justice John Roberts, and in 2006 of
Associate Justice Samuel Alito, to the Supreme Court; several
standing decisions of the early Terms of the Roberts Court, and the
continuing and ongoing scholarly debate over the role of Congress in
statutorily providing for standing. The Article begins in Part 11 by
briefly summarizing the evolution and current status of standing
requirements. Part 111 then examines the record of Justices Roberts
and Alito on standing before 2005, as revealed in their scholarly
writing, their votes as lower court judges, and their testimony in
confirmation hearings before Congress.
Part IV of the Article focuses on standing cases in the Roberts
Court. The first section considers those requirements in light of the
revival of interest in originalist modes of constitutional interpretation
in the academy, and on the Court itself. That section concludes that
the Court, in light of recent cases, is unlikely to adopt originalism as
an exclusive, much less consistent or coherent, guide to applying
standing requirements. The second section of Part IV turns to
nonorginalist modes of developing and applying standing
requirements. Both in the Rehnquist and now Roberts Courts, the
Justices have often emphasized that separation of powers concerns,
regarding the limited role of federal courts, have animated standing
requirements. This has been manifested by the Court's hostility
towards taxpayer standing, though the Roberts Court has also
expanded the ability of states to satisfy standing. Separation of
powers also implicates the application of "citizen suit" provisions in
federal statutes. Those provisions on their face often seem to
empower citizens or persons to bring suit in federal court,
notwithstanding standing requirements. However, the Court has
usually required that Article Ell standing must be satisfied, despite the
presence of a broadly worded citizen-suit provision. But the Court's
position on that point has not been a model of clarity, seeming to
create space for Congress to be more assertive in facilitating standing
through carefully drafted statutes. That possibility is the subject of the
third section of Part IV, which revisits how often and under what
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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circumstances Congress enacts citizen-suit provisions, and what that
portends for judicial application of those provisions.
The article concludes in Part V, by briefly addressing the likely
development of standing requirements in the Roberts Court, and
Congress's statutory attention to those requirements during the
Obama presidency.4
I1. STANDING, IN BRIEF
Because reams of paper have been printed on standing
requirements in federal courts,5 only a short review is necessary here.6
The history of the development of standing is a contested one. A
useful way to view that complicated history is through the lens of the
models of dispute resolution (or private rights) and law declaration
(or public rights).7 Prior to the early decades of the twentieth century,
4I am primarily concerned with "understand~ing] standing doctrine [on] its own terms."
LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 290 (2d ed. 2003). 1 agree with Yackle that alternate
explanations for Supreme Court decisions on standing are often advanced, such as that they are
"disguised judgments on the merits, the justices' assurances to the contrary notwithstanding."
Id. at 289. 1 am not entirely dismissive of these alternate explanations, but I think doctrine does
matter, and it is a worthwhile scholarly enterprise to take doctrine seriously. While many
political scientists have long assumed that virtually all decision-making by life-tenured Supreme
Court Justices on standing (and much else) is simply based on their policy preferences, e.g.,
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 230-34 (2002) (discussing standing), a more nuanced critique of Court decision-
making has emphasized the importance of how legal institutions and doctrine places bounds on
judicial choice, Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzrnan, Does Legal Doctrine Matter?
Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am. POL. Sd. REV.
369 (2008); Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261 (2006). 1 will not
address alternative critiques of standing doctrine, such as those based on law and economics,
e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2007), social
choice theory, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 875 (2008), cognition theory, e.g., Eileen
Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision
Making, 68 J. POL. 308 (2006), or political science, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITrICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 48-49 (2006); Lee Epstein
et aL, The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should Continue to Yearn
and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REV. 651 (2008).
5State courts also apply standing requirements, sometimes drawing on, sometimes
departing from, federal law on point. Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating Justiciability in Ohio
Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (2004) (focusing on standing in one state); Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental
Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003 (2001) (analyzing the use of federal
citizen-suit provisions in state courts). A full discussion of standing in state courts is beyond the
scope of the present article.
6 For much more extensive summaries and discussions of justiciability and standing
requirements, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 43-172 (5th ed. 2007), and
LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 303-409 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS].
7For excellent overviews of these models, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 72-76 (6th ed. 2009), and
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6, at 16-24.
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most justiciability issues were resolved by asking whether the
plaintiff had suffered an injury that would be recognized at common
law. Typically, this would mean that a "defendant's violation of a
legal duty to the plaintiff [must have] caused a distinct and palpable
injury to a concrete, legally protected interest."' This model came
under increasing pressure from the development of the regulatory
state and the expansion of substantive constitutional rights, which
"4created diffuse rights shared by large groups and new legal
relationships that are hard to capture in traditional, private law
terms."9 A newer public rights model permitted holders of such rights
to have standing to enforce them. Modern standing doctrine reflects
aspects of both models, and the grant or denial of standing in a given
case can often be conceptualized or justified under either model. 10
Modern cases hold that Article II requires that plaintiffs
demonstrate a concrete injury, one caused by and traceable to the
actions of the defendant, and likely to be redressed by relief a court
can order." Other justiciability requirements are not said to be drawn
directly from the Constitution, but rather are followed as a matter of
prudence by federal courts. These include that plaintiffs are usually
not permitted to raise the rights of persons not parties to the lawsuit,
that cases cannot proceed if they are not ripe for decision or,
conversely, have become moot, or that courts are reluctant to decide
political questions, because they are better resolved by the other
branches of government. 12Sometimes the line between these
requirements is not always clear. A good example is generalized
grievances. The Court has held that such grievances may not be the
basis of an injury to satisfy standing, but has not been clear what such
grievances are,'" or whether the barrier to bring such cases is a
constitutional or prudential one.'14
During the Warren Court and the early years of the Burger Court,
the perception of most observers was that federal judges, for the most
8 FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 73.
9' Id. at74.
10 Id. at 74-75.
1E.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); Sprint Commc'ns
Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. CtL 2531, 2535 (2008).
12 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
'3 FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (discussing prior cases and concluding that
generalized grievances are those that are widely shared, and by nature "abstract and indefinite").
14 Id. ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has
sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process,
rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared
grievance."). For further discussion of this point, see YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6,
at 342-46, and Craig A. Stem, Another Sign From Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a
Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 L-EWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1169 (2008).
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part, were making it easier for plaintiffs to satisfy standing
requirements. The perception has, for the most part, cut the other way
in the last quarter-century.'15 That turn is doctrinally marked by the
Court's more recent emphasis on separation of powers as a way to
shape, and limit, standing in federal courts. The most notable
exemplar of this trend was Allen v. Wright in 1984. There, in the
course of holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain
actions of a federal agency, the majority, in an opinion by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, emphasized that the case or controversy
requirement draws on separation of powers concerns.'16  Those
concerns are premised, the Court said, on an understanding of the
proper and limited role of unelected courts in government.'17 In other
cases, the Court has emphasized that standing requirements
appropriately channel and narrow the instances when federal courts
are called upon to exercise the power of judicial review.'18
A particularly confusing and controversial corollary of these
concerns has been the issue of what role Congress may play in
statutorily modifying standing requirements.' 9  The Court's
pronouncements on this topic have not been a model of clarity. Least
controversial, it seems, are statutes that authorize private persons to
bring suit, in various ways, on behalf or as an agent of the United
States .2 More problematic are "citizen-suit" statutes, which authorize
suit by most any citizen or person, seemingly notwithstanding
whether that person would otherwise satisfy standing requirements.
The Court has strongly suggested that there are limits to Congress's
power to grant standing in that situation.2
15 For an overview and some statistical support for the conventional wisdom, see
STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIvism 112-15 (2009);
Stearns, supra note 4, at 891-917. It seems fair to observe that plaintiffs in some of the iconic
cases from the Warren and Burger Courts would either have not satisfied traditional notions of
justiciability or benefited from more flexible notions of exceptions to standing. See FALLON ET
AL., supra note 7, at 74 (observing that the "widely shared interests" of voters challenging
malapportioned districts, or of students challenging school prayer, "differ markedly from the
liberty and economic interests recognized at common law"); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 96 (1996) (observing that the plaintiffs in cases
challenging abortion restrictions were allowed to proceed despite mootness concemns).
16 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-52.
17 Id. at 750.
18 E.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); Hein v. Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U. S. 587, 598-99 (2007) (Alito, J., joined hy Roberts, C.J., and
Kennedy, J.).
19 For a lucid discussion, see YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6, at 382-97.
20 E.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000)
(upholding qui tam statute that offered a bounty to a prevailing plaintiff).
21 Whether a statute grants standing should be distinguished from the separate, albeit
related, analytical issue of whether Congress has created a private cause of action in federal
court. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6, at 386.
1028 Vol. 59:4
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The leading case here is the 1992 decision in Defenders of Wildlife
v. Lujan.2 That case involved a challenge to certain federal agency
action (or inaction) concerning the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, first held that the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the traditional standing criteria .2 ' The ESA
contained a citizen-suit provision, purporting to confer standing to
"4any person" challenging the agency action. The Court held that
Congress could create enforceable "procedural rights," but could not
circumvent the injury-in-fact requirement by statutorily granting such
rights, "unconnected" to anyone's "own concrete harni." 24 To permit
Congress to grant standing to a party without an injury, the Court
concluded, would improperly transfer from the executive branch to
the judicial branch the President's constitutional duty under Article HI
to "'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 25 The upshot
was that, despite the broad congressional grant of standing, a plaintiff
still needed to satisfy the injury-in-fact component of the Article III
standing requirements. Some commentators suggested that Lujan
called into question the ability of Congress to confer standing under
any circumstances outside the boundaries of Article 111. 26
But the criticism seems overwrought. In Lujan, Justice Scalia
endorsed earlier cases where Congress had statutorily elevated "to the
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that
were previously inadequate in law."2 Justice Anthony Kennedy, in an
22 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
23 The plaintiffs sued to enforce a provision of the ESA that required the Secretary of the
Interior to consult with other agencies regarding the environmental effect of certain U.S.-funded
construction projects in other countries. The Court held that plaintiffs' vague interest in being
exposed to affected animals in the future was not the sort of personal injury that could satisfy
standing requirements. Id. at 561-64.
24 Id. at 573 n.8.
25 Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3).
26 E.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen's Suits, "Injuries, "
and Article 111, 91 MtCH. L. REV. 163 (1992). For more favorable assessments of Lujan, see
Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1793 (1993) and Stem, supra note 14, at 1186. For overviews of the scholarly debate over
Lujan, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 142-46 and YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note
6, at 387-94.
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. The most prominent of these cases cited by Justice Scalia was
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), which involved a citizen-suit provision
in the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The Act states that a "..person aggrieved"' may bring suit in
federal court to enforce the anti-discrimi nation provisions of the Act, and defines such a person
as one ..'who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice."' Id. at 206 n.1
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1968, Plub. L. No. 90-284, § 8 1 0(a), 82 Stat. 85)). The plaintiffs in
Trafficante had not been the direct targets of discri mi nation, but claimed to have lost the
benefits of living in an integrated community. Id. at 208. As emphasized by a concurring
opinion, it seems difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs, given the generalized nature of their
injury, would satisfy standing requirements absent the statute. Id. at 212 (White, J., concurring).
029
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influential concurring opinion, observed that the complexity of
government programs suggested that courts should be "sensitive to
the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear
analogs in our common-law tradition."2 In that regard, he continued,
Congress can "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before," but
cannot simply authorize "any person" to bring a case .29 The skeletal
articulation of the citizen-suit provision at issue in Lujan did not meet
this requirement.
After Lujan, the Court in 1998 gave a more generous interpretation
and application to a citizen-suit provision in FEC v. Akins.30 There,
plaintiffs challenging an action by the Federal Election Commission
relied on a statute that authorized "'I[alny party aggrieved by"' the
agency decision to seek judicial review in federal court.' Over the
dissent of Justice Scalia, the majority (per Justice Stephen Breyer)
found the plaintiffs' injuries-deprivation of political information by
the agency-satisfied the standing requirements of Article III. While
the injury seemed to resemble a non-justiciable generalized grievance,
the majority held that the lack of information was tied to the right to
vote and to participate in the political process, and was of a concrete
and specific nature. The Court unpacked the notion of a generalized
grievance. An interest may be widely shared, but it may also involve
concrete harm, and in those circumstances the injury-in-fact
requirement can be satisfied .32 The citizen-suit provision, the Court
held, should be interpreted broadly to encompass the suit.33
These cases leave muddled the scope of congressional authority to
affect standing. Several readings of the cases are possible. The
narrowest is that a plaintiff must always satisfy all standing
requirements no matter what a statute provides. A broader reading is
that a statute may displace the prudential standing requirements,
though perhaps nothing more (recall that the Court has not been clear
on whether the bar against hearing generalized grievances, however
defined, is a constitutional or prudential one). Broader still, the cases
might suggest that Congress can recognize injuries that would not
have satisfied common law requirements, at least when statutory, as
opposed to constitutional, rights are at issue. Other nuanced views are
28 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring).
29 Id.
30 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
3' Id. at 19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 437g(8)(a)) (brackets in original).
32 Id. at 24-25.
33 Id. at 19 ("History associates the word 'aggrieved' with a congressional intent to cast
the standing net broadly-beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory ights
upon which 'prudential' standing traditionally rested.").
1030 Vol. 59:4
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possible, given whatever vision of the private and public rights
models one cares to follows. 34 What the cases seem to reject is the
notion that Congress can empower plaintiffs who lack the core Article
III standing requirements to sue.
Ill. JOHN ROBERTS AND SAmuEL AuTO ON STANDING, BEFORE THE
ROBERTS COURT
Justices Roberts and Alito had, in their public and private
capacities, addressed standing issues before being appointed to the
Supreme Court. Both also addressed such issues in their confirmation
hearings before Congress in 2005 and 2006. An assessment of that
record can shed light on their current and likely future views on these
issues.
The most substantial and revealing statement is an article by
Roberts in the annual administrative law symposium in the Duke Law
Journal in 1993.~ Much of the article is taken up with a defense of
the majority decision in Lujan, which was argued on behalf of the
government by the Office of the Solicitor General during Roberts's
service as the Principal Deputy Solicitor General.3 It is only fourteen
pages long, but, as a clearly written, sophisticated, and measured
analysis of case law that engages adverse scholarly commentary, it
would do any scholar proud, despite (or perhaps because of) its
brevity.3
34 Some scholars have suggested that Lujan and Akins are inconsistent with respect to the
interpretation and application of citizen-suit provisions. See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, What's
Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677,
678-79 (2007) [hereinafter Brown, FECA Suits]; Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of
Standing, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1505, 1536 (2008). For extensive discussion of these issues, see
FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 140-46 and YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6, at 39 1-
97.
35 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE U.. 1219
(1993). The symposium was on Lujan, and Roberts's article was responsive to other articles,
critical of the decision, in the same issue. See Nichol, supra note 26; Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power,
42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993).
36 Roberts did not argue the case, nor did he sign the brief, see Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557 (1992) (listing counsel), but he may have had some role in
overseeing the government's presentation of the case. He had earlier, and successfully, argued
for the government in another standing case. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
874 (1990) (listing counsel). Roberts was a partner at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson when he
wrote the article. Roberts, supra note 35, at 1219 n.t. See also Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr.
Nice Guy, NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, at 42, 49 (further discussing Roberts' argument in
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation and his views on standing).
37 In his confirmation hearings for Chief Justice, Roberts (perhaps mischievously) refers
to the article as "that small little Law Review comment." Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 342 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation
Hearings]. The article has been cited and discussed numerous times by federal courts scholars.
031
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Much of the article consists of a fairly conventional defense of
Lujan, describing it as a "sound and straightforward decision," that
"can hardly be regarded as remarkable. 38 Roberts reiterates the
traditional arguments, drawn from separation of powers theory, that
standing requirements properly delimit the role and power of an
unelected, life-tenured judiciary.3 While he acknowledges the
academic arguments that the injury-in-fact requirement is not, as a
matter of history, a constitutional requirement, 40 he argues that the
Court has never accepted that position, and thus Congress cannot
dismiss the requirement. Responding to criticism that the standing
requirements lack precise definitions, Roberts concedes that they "are
not objectively verifiable, self-defining terms," but argues that they
are "reasonably precise guidelines of the sort common to the lawyer's
craft.",4' He wonders how difficult a burden the decision really places
on plaintiffs. If there were really many people in the Lujan plaintiffs'
interest group, with specific plans to visit the regions affected by U.S.
aid, "it is not unreasonable to wonder why the organization relied on
such weak affidavits."4
More interesting are those portions of the article that undertake a
deeper analysis of congressional statutes that purport to grant
standing. The statute in Lujan, Roberts says, was no such statute. Its
reference to "any person" should have been construed-under usual
principles of statutory interpretation-in a manner consistent with the
requirement that "only those who suffer actual injury have standing to
sue."43 Other citizen-suit provisions, he noted, make reference to a
citizen being adversely affected, and, in any event, a close look at the
statute involved in Lujan yields the conclusion that it was not
intended to be a vehicle to enforce procedural rights.44 More
See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 140 n.2; Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense
of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 381, 396 n. 113; Farber, supra note 34, at 1529 n. 114; Stem,
supra note 14, at 1186 n. 108.
38 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1219, 1226.
39 Id. at 1220, 1224.
40 Id. at 1121-22. Roberts cited the leading articles taking this position. Id. at 1222 n.23
(citing articles by Gene Nichol, Raoul Berger, Louis Jaffee, Cass Sunstein, and Steven Winter).
41 Id. at 1223.
42 Id. at 1225. The affiants referred to an ..'inten[t]' to return to the places they had visited
before .. , without any description of concrete plans." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 564 (1992).
43 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1227.
44 id. at 1226-28. As an example of a citizen-suit provision that defines a citizen as one
who has been adversely affected, Roberts cites the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)
(1988). Id. at 1227 n.52. As a matter of statutory interpretation, Roberts agrees (not surprisingly)
with the government's position in Lujan, that the suit should have been brought under the
Admninistrative Procedure Act, which limits suits to those who are ..'adversely affected or
1032 Vol. 59:4
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generally, Roberts continued, Lujan "in no way inhibits Congress
from pursuing substantive objectives ." Congress can still cut off
funding or engage in oversight hearings. Thus, a standing decision
"4simply means that Congress cannot enlist the federal courts in its
enterprise," and indeed it "compels the other branches of government
to do a better job in carrying out their [constitutional]
responsibilities ."
In the last portion of the article, Roberts responds to the long-
standing charge that standing decisions mask the political agenda of
judges. Standing, he says, "is an apolitical limitation on judicial
power," since it restricts conservative and liberal interest groups from
challenging liberal or conservative agency action or inaction,
respectively.4 He concludes that to discard virtually all limits on
standing, as many critics of Lujan argue, would improperly transform
courts "into ombudsmen of the administrative bureaucracy, a role for
which they are ill-suited both institutionally and as a matter of
democratic theory.",4 8
Roberts's article and his overall views on standing were addressed
at his confirmation hearings for Chief Justice. Environmental interest
groups opposed his nomination in part due to the opinions expressed
in that article, and what they considered his crabbed view of citizen-
suit provisions .4 9 The topic came up several times in the hearings.
Several of the Republican senators asked him to review the arguments
made in the article.5 One Democratic senator stated that, in the
article, Roberts was "somewhat dismissive regarding these citizen
aggrieved"'. by the agency action. Id. at 1127 n.53 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)). As Roberts
notes, the Court in Lujan did hold that the citizen-suit provision encompassed the challenge
brought by the plaintiffs, though, of course, it held against plaintiffs on standing grounds. Id. at
1221.-
45 Id. at 1229.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1230. Roberts added (and apparently agrees with) the oft-made assertion that
standing doctrine was developed to limit conservatives from attacking New Deal government
action in federal court. The same standing decisions were later used by "'judges with a quite
different political orientation."' Id. at 1230 n.64 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1438 (1988)). Both liberals, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra, at 1472-73, and conservatives, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 458-59 (1996),
have agreed with this assessment.
48 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1232.
49 Paul Alexander Fortenbenry & Daniel Canton Beck, Chief Justice Roberts-
Constitutional Interpretations ofArticle III and the Commerce Clause: Will the "Hapless Toad"
and "John Q. Public" Have Any Protection in the Roberts Court?, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 55,
61-62 (2005).
50 E.g., Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 37, at 342-43, 381-82 (colloquies
with Sens. Mike Dewine and John Comyn).
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suits to protect the environment. 51 But overall, Roberts's views on
standing were not a focal point of the hearings, and it is difficult to
believe that any senators voted in favor of or in opposition to his
nomination, based on those views alone.
Unlike John Roberts,5 Samuel Alito authored a number of judicial
opinions that addressed standing requirements prior to his
nomination. While serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Alito authored a number of opinions on standing that do not
demonstrate great sympathy with expansive notions of standing but,
overall, seem to be fairly uncontroversial applications of existing
law.5 The partial exception is Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc. ("PIRG"),5 where Judge
Alito silently concurred in a decision that held that members of a
public interest group lacked 'standing to pursue claims against a
manufacturer for discharging effluents in violation of the Clean Water
Act. Despite the presence of a citizen-suit provision,5 the court held
that standing was not shown when there was no evidence that a river
had been harmed by the alleged violations, even though plaintiffs had
56
reduced their use of the river.
51 Id. at 155 (colloquy with Sen. Patrick J. Leahy). Roberts responded by noting that in the
article, he had supported the use of environmental harms and aesthetic interests to support
standing. Id. at 156. He did indeed make such statements in the article, though it was in the
context of noting that the Court had "not revisited" cases that held that such interests can
support standing. Roberts, supra note 35, at 1231 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734 (1972)). On the same page he added that, even in these situations, a plaintiff must
demonstrate some injury. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64
(1992)). Chief Justice Roberts recently joined in an opinion of the Court that reaffirmed this
understanding of environmental harms and standing. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.
Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-36 (1972)).
52 Prior to his appointment as Chief Justice, Roberts served from 2003 to 2005 on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. He authored only a handful of opinions that
addressed standing at any length, none of them particularly controversial. See, e.g., Hedgepeth
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (prospective harm to
reputation satisfied standing); Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (costs imposed by FERC order supplied injury, even if lost money could be
recouped in the future)..
53 E.g., Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 193-95 (3d Cir. 2004) (declaratory
judgment plaintiff satisfied causation prong); ACLU-NJ v. Township of Wall, 246 F.3d 258,
263-66 (3d Cir. 2001) (challengers to Christmas display lacked standing as taxpayers or
because of a psychological injury, though question was "close"); Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v.
Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (plaintiffs did not satisfy standing
requirements of the Lanham Act); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1245-46 (3d Cir. 1992)
(Alito, J., concurring) (convicted murderer did not have third party standing to raise the rights of
grand jurors allegedly excluded from serving on the basis of race).
- 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997). Judge Roth authored the majority opinion; Judge Lewis
dissented.
55 This is the same one Roberts mentioned in his article. See supra note 44.
56 Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc., 123 F.3d at 119-25.
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The Supreme Court called that holding into doubt three years later
in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc .57 That case held that the same citizen-suit provision at
issue in PIRG should be interpreted only to require that the plaintiffs
had suffered injury, not that the environment had been damaged as
such.5 It also held that plaintiffs had standing to seek civil penalties
payable to the government, and the claim did not become moot once
the company defendant came into compliance with the law.5 While
none of the opinions in Laidlaw cited or discussed PIRG, and each
case presented different facts, the interpretation of the citizen-suit
provision overlapped. The former case calls into question the
correctness of the latter.6 Several Democratic senators chastised
Judge Alito at his confirmation hearings for joining the majority in
PIRG .6 1 Nonplussed, Alito noted that Laidlaw postdated PIRG, and,
to the extent the latter conflicted with the former, he would follow
precedent.6 With that exception, standing issues seemed to have
played even less of a role in Alito's confirmation hearings than they
did at Roberts's.
IV. ORIGINALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE TO CONGRESSIONAL STANDING JUDGMENTS
This section considers recent doctrinal and jurisprudential
developments that bear on the future of standing at the dawn of the
Roberts Court. The first part addresses the revival of interest in
originalism. as a constitutional interpretation methodology and its
import for standing doctrine. The second part addresses recent
57 528 U.S. 167 (2000). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for a 7-2 majority. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.
58 Id. at 180-85. The Court also cited the support of the Solicitor General (here, during the
Clinton Administration) as amnicus curiae in support ot plaintiffs. Id. at 188 n.4. Justice Scalia
was unimpressed, arguing that "in doubtful cases a long and uninterrupted history of
Presidential acquiescence and approval can shed light upon the constitutional understanding,"
but not when it was only "by a single administration." Id. at 2 10 0. (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court frequently supports the position taken by the
Solicitor General as amicus curiae. See Michael A. Bailey et al., Signals from the Tenth Justice:
The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 Am. J. POL.
Sci. 72 (2005).
59 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-94.
60) See Karl S. Copsa, Direct Environmental Standing for Chartered Conservation
Corporations, 12 DuKE ENvmL. L. & POL'Y F. 183, 199 (2001) ("At a minimum, . .. [Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.] seem[s] unsupportable in light of Laidlaw.").
61 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 485-86, 532-33 (2006) (colloquy with Sens. Patrick J. Leahy and
Dianne Feinstein).
62 Id. at 486, 533.
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standing decisions of the Roberts Court that turn, in whole or in part,
on separation of powers concerns and their impact on congressional
statutes that address standing issues. The section concludes with an
analysis of the deference the Court does, and ought to, give to citizen-
suit provisions in those statutes given separation of powers concerns.
A. Originalism and Standing
In the past two decades there has been a revival of academic
interest in originalism-or original public meaning in its most
influential manifestation-as an interpretative methodology in
constitutional law.6 That interest has influenced, and in turn been
influenced by, Supreme Court decisions that utilize originalist
frameworks, with the Court's recent decision on the Second
Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller0 as the most recent
example. What is less well appreciated is that a vigorous
debate over originalism has taken place with regard to standing
principles. Some commentators and Justices have argued for decades
that the presence or absence of standing in federal courts ought to
turn, in whole or in part, on whether the framers of Article mH would
have considered a particular case to be j usticiable.
The Court is fond of tracing its modern standing requirements to
the language of Article II stating that federal courts are to only hear
"4cases"~ or "controversies." According to modern opinions, those
terms refer to disputes that were "traditionally amenable" to
resolution by courts, which in turn usually means those brought by
plaintiffs who satisfy the modern three-factor test.6 But there appears
to have been little discussion among the Framers of what these terms
meant. 66 A brace of modern commentators have vigorously argued
that at the time of the framing of Article Ell, English practice
permitted citizens under some circumstances to challenge official
action in court, even when they had not suffered an injury in the
63 Even a brief overview of the considerable scholarly literature on originalism is beyond
the scope of this Article. For useful summaries of that enormous literature, see Thomas B.
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 240 (2009); Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009), Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1185, 1188-9 1, Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the "Challenge of Change ": Abduced-
Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates
Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927 (2009), and Keith E. Whittington, 7The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUBs. POL'Y 599 (2004).
64 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
65 E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
66 See LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 76 (1994) [hereinafter
YACKLE, RECLAIMING]; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 278-79 (2008).
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modem sense of the term.6 These commentators often argue that
standing is a construct of twentieth century jurisprudence, tied to the
perceived inadequacies of the private rights model in the modem
world.6
Not everyone agrees. Several commentators, closely examining
cases from the early decades of the Republic, have concluded that the
Supreme Court and other federal courts "did see a constitutional
dimension to standing doctrine," even though the word "standing"
only came into use in the later half of the twentieth century. 6 ' This
was true, they argue, even when a legislatively created cause of action
70 th
suggested that the plaintiff would have standing. Whole thse early
cases are not models of clarity, these commentators, with equal vigor,
argue that modern standing is not a modem invention contradicting
history.7
These revisionists concede that qui tam statutes Congress passed in
the early Republic pose a challenge to their view. Those statutes
authorized private citizens, labeled "relators," to bring actions on
behalf of the United States, seeking civil penalties and damages for
payments wrongfully made by the government due to false claims of
persons providing goods or services to the government. When such an
action succeeds, the relator receives a bounty in the form of a
percentage of the payments made by the wrongdoer to the
72government. These statutes (eventually codified in one statute
during the Civil War) are examples of Congress statutorily providing
for standing when the relator would not independently satisfy
standing requirements. Given their pedigree, one might conclude that
the Framers thought they were consistent with the requirements of
Article LII. The revisionists caution against drawing too many
conclusions from this history. They observe that the defendants in qui
67 FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 146 (citing, inter alia, Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in
Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969) and Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371
(1988)).
68 FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 146-47 (citing, inter alia, Sunstein, supra note 26, at
169). Chief Justice Roberts was cognizant of this debate at the time he was writing his article in
1993. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
69 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 692 (2004).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 691. For other work disputing the suggestion that English practice often dispensed
with what we today call standing requirements, see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the
English Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1048 (1997)
and James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article It, the Injury-in-Fact
Rule, and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,
42 (2001).
72 FALLON ET AL.., supra note 7, at 150; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 69, at 725-26.
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tam actions were (and are) typically private parties, rather than
government officials who are the object of many (though of course
not all) present day citizen-suit provisions. Moreover, they assert, the
qui tam statute can be regarded as a narrow exception to ordinary
standing requirements, and one that did not generate any significant
litigation until amendments to the statute in 1986. So, they conclude,
the qui tam statute should not be regarded as a broad precedent
authorizing Congress to statutorily empower plaintiffs who otherwise
would not satisfy standing requirements.7
As demonstrated by his article, Chief Justice Roberts was not
oblivious to the issues posed by the use of history to inform standing
requirements, or the specific issues raised by the qui tam statutes.
While disclaiming any attempt to fully respond to the historical
arguments, he did argue in a long footnote that reliance on such
history "must be tempered with a recognition that the Framers were
moving from a unitary system of government to one of separated
powers."7 Thus, he continued, "[p]ractice prior to the framing of the
Constitution-and perhaps constitutionally dubious remnants
persisting thereafter-[was] not an infallible guide to the scope of
judicial power under Article HI.",7 With regard to the qui tam statute,
he noted that there was litigation challenging its constitutionality at
the time, and he cited, though not with explicit approval, an opinion
of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel that the statute
was unconstitutional .7
73 WooIhandler & Nelson, supra note 69, at 727-30.
74 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1222 n.20.
75 Id.
76 Id. Roberts cited a preliminary print of that opinion. For the final version, see
Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
207 (1989) (authored by William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC). The opinion was written in response to the then-pending litigation referenced by
Roberts, and because the Solicitor General was prepared to intervene in those cases to support
the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 208. The opinion bluntly concludes that the statute was
"1patently unconstitutional" because the relator has suffered no injury in fact, and that it was "not
even a close question." Id. at 209. The OLC was unimpressed by the historical pedigree of the
statute. Prior to the Civil War, it argued, the "only significant use of qui tam occurred in the
Federalist period," in relatively "arcane areas," and it appeared "from actual practice that with
very few exceptions," qui tam actions were either brought by government officials, or by
persons who had an injury in fact. Id. at 213, 228 n.13. The opinion concluded on the point that
"the argument that anything that could go into court in 1787 must be a ease or controversy [had]
unacceptable consequences." Id. at 228. Since at common law persons with no injury in fact
could challenge public actions through prohibition, mandamus, and other writs, among other
things, then today "any person could use these writs to challenge or compel government action
wholly unrelated to the person using the writ." Id. The opinion also argued that qui tam statutes
were unconstitutional on the grounds that the designation of relators violated the Appointments
and Take Care Clauses of Article II, Id. at 221-24, 228-32. During his confirmation hearings,
Roberts stated that he could not recall taking a public position on the constitutionality of the qui
tam statute. Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 37, at 323.
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The Court reached the issue in 2000 in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens7 and, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia, unanimously rejected the argument that the qui tam
statute violated the Article III standing requirements. The bounty
itself, the Court said, could not be considered an injury, since it was
simply the "'byproduct' of the suit itself.",78 However, the government
had suffered an injury by being defrauded, and the relator had
standing by being assigned the claim. This conclusion was
"confirmed ... by the long tradition of qui tam actions in England
and the American Colonies."79 After reviewing that history, the
majority considered it "well nigh conclusive" that such actions were
cases and controversies "'traditionally amenable to, and resolved by,
the judicial process."' 80 "When combined with the theoretical
justifications for relator standing," the Court concluded, "it [left] no
room for doubt that a qui tam relator . .. has Article HII standing., 81
Given the Court's close attention to the specific circumstances of the
development of the qui tam statute, it seems fair to conclude that
Stevens is confined to its peculiar facts, and does not stand as a broad
precedent with regard to other statutes that Congress might pass.8
In 2008, the Roberts Court revisited the use of originalism in
standing cases in Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services,
Inc.83 That case involved a plaintiff who was the assignee of a claim
and had promised to remit any proceeds of the litigation to the
assignor.8 The suit was originally brought by payphone operators
who argued they were entitled under the Communications Act of
1934 to compensation from certain long-distance carriers. Due to the
expense of litigation and the lack of size of individual claims, though,
the operators assigned their claims to collection firms, which in turn
agreed to remit any proceeds to the operators .8 ' The defendant
77 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
78 Id. at 773.
79 Id. at 774.
10 Id. at 777 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
81 Id. at 778. The Court added that it was expressing no view on possible Article II
challenges to the statute. Id. at 778 n.8. These were the same challenges that concerned the OLC
in 1989. See Constitutionality of the Qui Tamn Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 207 passimt (1989). The Court made no mention of this opinion in the Stevens
case. It was cited in the briefing in the case. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 44, 46, Stevens, 529 U.S.
765 (No. 98-1828).
82 See Wolhandler & Nelson, supra note 69, at 731; see also Farber, supra note 34, at
1533-35 (arguing that Justice Scalia in Lujan made little effort to defend his conclusions on
originalist grounds).
83 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008).
84 Id. at 2533.
85 Id. at 2534.
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companies challenged the standing of these collection firms as
plaintiffs."6
The Court, splitting five to four, held in an opinion by Justice
Breyer that the collection firms had standing. The Court, after citing
the familiar three-part test for standing, began by observing that it had
"often said that history and tradition offer a meaningful guide to the
types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider."817
In an exhaustive and exhausting analysis of cases and treatises from
England, colonial America, and the early decades of the Republic, the
Court found that history and precedent was "'well nigh conclusive"'
that suits by assignees, including those for collection only, fell within
88the traditional understanding of cases and controversies. The
defendants did not offer "any convincing reason" to depart from this
historical practice and, the Court continued, "I[iln any event," the
standing requirements "articulated in more modern decisions of th[e]
Court" had been satisfied.89 On that front, the Court held that the
assignment created enough of an injury to satisfy Article HII, and that
there were no prudential reasons to find lack of standing.90
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a vigorous dissent.9' "We have never,"
he said, "approved federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the
entire relief requested will run to a party not before the court.
Never.",92 He argued that, properly understood, the cases articulating
injury-in-fact principles were not satisfied. Nor was the seemingly
similar case of Stevens, since the Court, in that case, was careful to
note that the assignment involved there vested a legal right in the
relator and a personal stake in the recovery.9 Nor did history,
according to Roberts, support the majority. The historical sources, he
argued, only supported the general proposition that assignees could
sue on the assigned claims, but were "either nonexistent or equivocal"
on the precise issue of assignors who claimed no right to any
94
recovery. Engaging in a lengthy analysis of those sources, aimost
matching that of the majority, the dissent echoed concerns mentioned
in the Chief Justice's law review article. The historical tradition on
point, he argued, was simply not as clear or as entrenched as, by
86 Id. at 2534-35.
87 Id. at 2535.
88 Id. at 2541-42 (quoting Vermnont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777 (2000)).
89 Id. at 2542.
90 id. at 2543-45.
91 Id. at 2549 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
92 Id. at 2551.
93 Id. at 2550.
94 Id. at 2553.
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comparison, that involving the qui tam statute. He added that while
the Court had "sometimes looked to cases postdating the founding era
as evidence of common-law traditions," it had not done so "when the
courts self-consciously confronted novel questions arising from a
break in the received tradition, or where the practice of later courts
was so
divergent.",95 Putting the same point another way, the dissent chided
the Court for relying "on an equivocal and contradictory tradition to
override the clear application of the case-or-controversy requirement
that would otherwise bar [the] suit.",96
Despite the lavish attention to history in the opinions in Sprint, it
seems unlikely that the case portends a definitive turn toward
originalism in standing jurisprudence, for several reasons. In both
Stevens and Sprint, the Court did not rely exclusively on originalist
analysis, but utilized it only in conjunction with the modem standing
principles. The relationship between the two is not clear, and the
decisions were not faced, as they saw it, with the stark issue of
originalist analysis being in direct conflict with modern standing
requirements. Moreover, while the Court's review and use of history
in Stevens seemed uncontroversial, the same cannot be said for its
lengthy and inconclusive survey in Sprint. 7 Finally, Chief Justice
Roberts's comments in Sprint and his article suggest that he is not
enamored of originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation
98for Article IHI and, perhaps, other provisions .
B. Beyond Originalism: Taxpayers, States, and Standing
The early Terms of the Roberts Court saw two controversial
standing decisions that turned largely on the application of modern
standing principles-with only a limited nod toward history.99
95 Id. at 2557.
96 Id. at 25 58.
97 Samuel Issacharoff, Priv'ate Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REv. 183, 189
(arguing that the Sprint opinions undertake "an extremely formnal account of the history of
assignment of claims"). For example, much of the dueling opinions was taken up in disputing
whether a student law review comment published in 1967 correctly characterized the state of the
law on an assignee's interest as of that date. Compare Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2540 (majority
opinion), with id. at 2556 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
98 See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARv. L. REV.
145, 179 (2008) (arguing that Roberts is more a pragmatist and doctrinalist than an originalist);
Laura Krugman Ray, The Style of a Skeptic: The Opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, 83 IND. L.J.
997, 998 (2008) (arguing that Roberts is a judicial skeptic "who favors experience over
theory"). As his article demonstrates, Roberts is also not oblivious to the historical arguments in
favor of a broad application of citizen-suit provisions, and perhaps he feels that a decisive turm
towards oniginalism in standing cases would make it difficult to resist such arguments. See
Roberts, supra note 35, at 1220-22.
99 In its early Terms, the Roberts Court has also decided several standing cases not
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The first case was Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc. ,"0 which held that federal taxpayers lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the President's efforts to use federal money for
his "faith-based initiatives." The path to Hein is well known to
students of federal courts doctrine, and need only be briefly canvassed
here. The Court first directly addressed the issue in Frothingham v.
Mellon,' 0' which unanimously held that a taxpayer lacked standing to
challenge a federal statute that provided financial support to states for
maternity programs, on the basis that it exceeded Congress's
Article I powers. The Court found that the plaintiffs' payment of
taxes was not enough of an injury for standing purposes, given their
minute nature in light of the vast number of taxpayers.102
If Frothingham is a prototypical example of the application of the
private rights model, then the Warren Court's reexamination of the
case in Flast v. Cohen' 03 comes close to being a classic case of the
public rights model.i"' That case held that taxpayers had standing to
challenge the constitutionality, on Establishment Clause grounds, of a
law Congress passed in 1965 to provide financial support for
educational programs in religious schools.10 5  Frothingham was
distinguished on several grounds. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing
for the majority, suggested that the bar of Frothingham rested on
prudential rather than constitutional grounds.1'6 Revisiting whether
taxpayers had standing, the Court held that such plaintiffs must satisfy
a two-part nexus test: "a logical link between" taxpayer status and the
legislative enactment at issue, and "a nexus between that status and
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."'0 7 The
test was satisfied in Flast, since the Establishment Clause was
deemed to be a specific limit on Congress's taxing and spending
power, but it had not been in Frothingham because there no specific
limit was at issue. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, arguing
discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (per curiam)
(citizens had only generalized grievance with regard to challenge to congressional redistricting
plan); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.) (no standing in
federal court based on state-taxpayer status); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct.
1142 (2009) (5-4 decision) (Scalia, J., for the majority) (environmental organizations and their
members lacked standing to challenge certain Forest Service regulations in the absence of an
imminent harm to their interests).
M 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
101262 U.S. 447 (1923).
01Id. at 487-89.
1- 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
104See FALLON Er AL.. supra note 7. at 121 (making this comparison).
'
05 Flast, 392 U.S. at 88.
106Id. at 92-94.
1071Id. at 102.
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that (among other things) the taxpayers had no personal interests at
stake, and thus were representing the public interest. Such claims
should not be justiciable, he concluded, unless Congress had
authorized them.108
What is particularly notable and underappreciated about Flast is
that Congress had considered authorizing taxpayers to challenge the
constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, the statute at issue in the case. There is clear legislative history
that, in both the House and the Senate at the committee level and in
debate on the floor, members of Congress considered, but rejected,
amendments that would have authorized taxpayers to bring a
constitutional challenge in federal court.109 These provisions were part
of a larger (though unsuccessful) effort by Senator Sam J. Ervin and
others in the 1 960s to authorize constitutional challenges to federal
statutes that authorized various kinds of aid to religious schools.",,
The Flast Court alluded to the rejected provisions.'1 ' Although the
modem view of statutory interpretation is highly skeptical of the
weight to be given rejected statutory proposals," 2 it is still striking
1081Id. at 131-32 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Harlan also appeared to
argue that plaintiffs could "have standing to represent the public interest[,] despite their lack
of economic or other personal interests," if authorized by Congress. Id. at 131. Famed
administrative law scholar Kenneth Davis, who was otherwise critical of the majority opinion,
was also critical of this aspect of Harlan's opinion. Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613-17 (1968).
10 Ti history is discussed in detail in the Brief of Amici Curiae, Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (No.
416), 1967 WL 93616. The amendments were rejected for a number of expressed reasons,
including that some members thought that judicial review would have been available anyway, in
light of the finding of standing in recent school prayer cases that arose from state courts, and the
presence of statutory language that permitted judicial review under specialized circumstances.
Id. at 15-18. The amicus brief nonetheless argued that the legislative history demonstrated that
Congress passed the 1965 Act on the assumption that there would be a judicial forum open to
hear any constitutional challenges. Id. at 15. In contrast, the lower court drew from the rejected
amendments the lesson that Congress did not wish to authorize such suits. Flast v. Gardner, 271
F. Supp. 1, 14 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (thrce-judge court), rev'd sub nom. Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
15 'LEO PFEFFER, GOD, CAESER, AND THLE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT As REFEREE OF
CHURCH-STATE CONFRONTATION 264-67 (1975); YACKLE, RECLAIMING, supra note 66, at 66.
Ervin was a long-standing opponent of federal aid to parochial schools, and sponsored
amendments to several statutes providing for such aid, authorizing constitutional challenges by
federal taxpayers. The amendments were not passed, the victim, according to one account, "of
heavy lobbying by both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations." Karl E. Campbell, Senator
Sam Ervin and School Prayer: Faith, Politics, and the Constitution, 45 J. CHURCH & ST. 443,
449 (2003). Ervin also filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in Flast. Id. at 449 n. 17.
"ISee Flast, 392 U.S. at 113 & n.8 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 133 & n.23
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority did not mention the rejected amendments, but did cite
subsequent hearings on other similar bills convened by Senator Ervin, in which legal scholars
and others addressed the propriety of such provisions. Id. at 92 n.6, 93 n.7, 94 n.8, 99 n.18
(majority opinion).
112 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND TIHE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1022-26 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing cases and
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that the Court approved of taxpayer standing in the face of expressed
congressional resistance.
The taxpayers' doctrinal victory in Flast was a temporary one.
While the precise Flast holding remained intact, the Court in
subsequent cases declined to extend the rationale. Most notable in this
regard was Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc.,'1 where the majority (per
Justice William Rehnquist) held that Flast did not cover a challenge
to the sale or lease of federal property to a religious college. Although
the challenge was on Establishment Clause grounds, the Court found
that the taxpayer plaintiffs lacked standing because an agency action
was the source of the complaint-and the agency action was pursuant
to a statute authorized under the Property Clause, not Congress's
taxing and spending powers.' 14 The decision "is difficult to reconcile
with Flast,"' since the majority was noticeably coolt16 toward the
public law paradigm of the case and, as Justice William Brennan's
dissent argued, the distinctions the majority drew were not especially
persuasive.117
The curtailment of Flast continued in Hein. That case involved an
Establishment Clause challenge to President George W. Bush's
executive orders, which, among other things, authorized the payment
of federal funds for faith-based social programs.' 18 Splitting five to
four, the Court held that federal taxpayers lacked standing to
challenge the program. Justice Alito authored the lead opinion, a
plurality joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy. The
opinion repeatedly emphasized the "narrow exception" Flast made
for taxpayer standing,"19 that Flast gave insufficient weight to
separation of powers concerns, and the limited role that federal courts
should have in reviewing the actions of the other branches of
government.120 The plurality found Flast inapplicable, since the
expenditures here, unlike in Flast, were not made by specific
scholarship).
113454 U.S. 464 (1982).
114 Id. at 479-80.
15 FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 122.
116 The majority opinion had a lengthy summary of the traditional, modem standing
principles, and the underlying separation of powers rationales, before a relatively brief summary
of Flast and its progeny that referred to the "Flast exception to the Frothingham principle."
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 48 1.
117 Id. at 505-12 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
'
18 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Ic., 551 U.S. 587, 592-96 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
1191d. at 602, 608, 615.
120 Id. at 611.
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congressional appropriation, but rather were made from general
monies Congress authorized for use by the executive branch.12 ' That
all said, the plurality declined an explicit call, made by some amici, 12
to overrule Flast. Acknowledging the debate, the plurality found it
unnecessary to overrule the case. It declined to extend Flast and left
the case "as [it] found it.",121
In contrast, in a characteristically combative concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that Flast should be
overruled. He argued that either Flast should logically be extended to
all challenges to government expenditures, or overruled as "wholly
irreconcilable" with the usual standing requirements. 14He argued
that Flust unpersuasively distinguished Frothingham and that Valley
Forge and later cases unpersuasively distinguished Flast. 125 By the
same token, he dismissed Flast as being based on nothing more than a
"Psychic Injury," and that it found no support in precedent "or our
Nation's history."126 For good measure, he added that Flast's double
nexus test failed to take into account and was not moored in
separation of powers concerns, and that the bar against taxpayer
standing was constitutional, not merely prudential. 17Justice David
Souter dissented, arguing that it was a logical extension of Flast to
apply it to both legislative and executive expenditures, and that, in
other cases, the Court had found standing for "esthetic" injuries that
were little different "than seeing one's tax dollars spent on
religion."12 8
Several aspects of Hein are noteworthy. The plurality opinion did
not undertake any originalist analysis.)29  Flast itself, and later
121 Id. at 605-09.
122 See Brief of the States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners,
Hein, 551 U.S. 587 (No. 06-157), 2007 WYL 62298; Amicus Brief of the American Center for
Law and Justice in Support of Petitioners, Hein, 551 U.S. 587 (No. 06-157), 2007 WL 43247.
123 Hein, 551 U.S. at 615. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that if
these taxpayers were found to have standing, it would lead to "1constant intrusion upon the
executive realm." Id. at 617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring).
125Id. at 620-28.
126 Id. at 632.
127Id. at 635-36, 634 n,5.
128 Id. at 642 (Souter, I., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, 33., dissenting) (citing
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Ne. Fla.
Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (inability to
compete for a contract was injury); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (living in a
racially gerrymandered electoral district was injury)).
129 See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendmnent Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HAMv
. R~v. 246, 249 n.19 (2008) (making this point). It was not for lack of trying by at least one
amicus brief. See Brief for Legal and Religious Historians and Law Scholars Paul Finkelman et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hein, 551 U.S. 587 (No. 06-157), 2007 WYL
320997.
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opinions in dissent, such as Justice Brennan's in Valley Forge and
Justice Souter's in Hein, all discuss the history of the Establishment
Clause and how it was intended as a barrier to federal funding of
religion. This may be true, but such originalism is too general to
properly inform the interpretation of Article III. As Justice Scalia
remarked in Hein, such history does not specifically address whether
the Framers intended taxpayer suits, under that Clause or any other, to
fall under Article M.1130 Still, given the body blows Flast has absorbed
in the past forty years, perhaps it is surprising that the
plurality did not join Justice Scalia in overruling the case. Part of the
answer might be that the Justices in the plurality gave greater
deference to precedent, especially when the government did not call
for Flast to be overruled. Moreover, an empirical study indicates that
lower federal courts have generally applied Flast narrowly, and it has
not led to the proverbial flood of cases by federal taxpayers. 13 ,
Still, Hein has hardly settled all of the issues on the fate of Flast.
One is whether the practical and oft-criticized limit of Flast to
Establishment Clause cases is a stable one. The fractured opinions in
Hein suggest that a differently constituted Court might be willing to
revisit the issue-even given the benefit of stare decisis-and perhaps
overrule Flast in its entirety. 12 (Extending Flast beyond the
Establishment Clause context seems extremely unlikely after Valley
Forge and Hein.) Justice Alito's opinion in Hein took pains to limit
Flast to explicit statutory authorization of expenditures, but it is not
clear how explicit it must be. The frequent, if controversial, use of
earmarks by Congress may eventually provide a test case of this
problem. 133 Finally, these cases involved the standing of federal
taxpayers, and it is not clear how federal courts should deal with
plaintiffs who claim standing as state or local taxpayers. 134
130 Hein, 551 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 802 (2003) (empirical study of federal court cases from
1982 to 2002 showed relatively few cases by federal taxpayers); cf. Davis, supra note 108, at
634 (arguing that flood argument against taxpayer standing is overblown, because there was no
flood of litigation prior to Frothingham, and courts can weed out frivolous cases).
132 Frdiscussion of these issues, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle:
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, hic. and the Future of Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 2008 BYU. L. REv. 115, 133-38. For the moment, lower courts consider Justice
Alito's opinion to be controlling. E.g., Laskowski v. Spellings, 546 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir.
2008).
133Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 132, at 138-45. Likewise, the continuation of federal
financial support to faith-based social programs in the Obama administration may lead to further
legal challenges. See Susan Jacoby, Op-Ed., Keeping the Faith, Ignoring the History, N.Y.
TmIEs, Mar. 1, 2009, at 11I (describing the federal constitutional problems with government-
aided religious programs).
'34Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 132, at 145-47. Staudt points out that federal courts have
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The other controversial case was also decided in 2007. In
Massachusetts v. EpA,1'5 a five to four decision, the Court held that a
state had standing to challenge a refusal by the Environmental
Protection Agency to issue regulations to govern greenhouse gas
emissions by motor vehicles. Massachusetts joined with twelve other
states and other plaintiffs to file a challenge in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia pursuant to a statute that vested
such challenges exclusively in that court. 136 The statute, however, said
nothing about which parties may bring such a challenge. The Court
held that, in these circumstances, the state was not required to fully
satisfy the ordinary standing requirements. When Congress has
"'accorded [a litigant] a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests,"' the litigant need not meet "'all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy.""13 7 Moreover, that procedural right
and the state's "stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests"
indicated that the state was entitled to "special solicitude in our
standing analysis."'138 With those postulates in mind, the majority
proceeded to find that Massachusetts met the standing requirements.
Massachusetts owns coastal property, and that property could be
affected by the rise in ocean levels potentially due to global warming.
This was true even though American cars would not be the sole
source of the emissions which lead to global warming, and that the
relief sought might only reduce "to some extent" the posited
environmental damage. 139
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito. He viewed the case through the lens of the three traditional
standing requirements, and he argued they were not satisfied. The
alleged injuries to Massachusetts, he asserted, were neither imminent
nor particularized, and instead were based largely on computer
models. Likewise, the "fractional amount of global emissions that
been more amenable to finding that state and local taxpayers have standing. See Staudt, supra
note 13 1, at 774. That trend might be subject to revision (especially in light of DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006)), even if Flast remains intact. Cf Smith v. Jefferson County
Sch. Bd. of Comm'rs, 549 F.3d 641, 652-55 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding, post-Hein, that municipal
taxpayers have standing to challenge public school actions alleged to violate the Establishment
Clause).
135549 U.S. 497 (2007).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006).
137 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 5 17-18 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
138 1Id. at 520. For the quasi-sovereign status of the state, the Court relied in part on
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). a case filed within the Court's original
jurisdiction, in which the state was permitted to protect the interests of state citizens (i.e., non-
parties to the suit) in a representative capacity.
139 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 5 26.
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might have been limited" by EPA actions could not be traced to the
injuries,140 and the relief requested could not redress the injuries. 14 1
Roberts concluded with the familiar argument that the majority's
loosened standing requirements constituted an intrusion upon the
policy decisions properly left to the elected branches of
government. 142
Given the high-profile nature of the substantive dispute, it is no
shock that Massachusetts received much attention in the popular14 3
and scholarly press.1"4 The majority opinion does arguably take an
ultra-flexible approach to the standing requirements, suggesting that
the requirements might be relaxed, or perhaps be subject to
inter-factor balancing, given the importance (e.g., potential existential
nature) of the underlying substantive issue. Many of the cases
discussed in this Article would need to be revisited if the
Massachusetts approach were to be applied across the board. But the
significance of the case should not be overstated. In his dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts suggested that the "diluted standing requirements" the
majority applied should be limited to states as plaintiffs, given the
majority's references to the quasi-sovereign status of states. 14 ' He
seems to correctly read the majority opinion, which at several points
emphasized the importance to its holding that states were the
plaintiffs.'"6 To be sure, even as so limited, the decision has
importance for emboldening states to be plaintiffs, and should
augment the recent activism of state attorney generals who will
typically bring such litigation, alone or in combination, on behalf of
140 Id. at 544.
141 Id. at 544-49 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). The
dissent also argued that the majority did not properly rely on the Tennessee Copper case. Id. at
537-38; see supra note 138. That case, the dissent asserted, had nothing to do with standing,
and merely stood for the proposition that a state had parens patriae authority to represent
citizens who themselves had to satisfy standing. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 537-38 (Roberts,
C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
142 Id. at 546-49.
14Se Kelsey McCowan Heilman, Comment, The Rights of Others: Protection and
Advocacy Organizations' Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 237 (2008)
(citing press reports).
'"4E.g., Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental
Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 Wm. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
121 (2008); Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 63 (2007); Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221
(2008) [hereinafter Brown, Generalized Grievances]; Farber, supra note 34; Bradford Mank,
Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's
New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008); Christie Henke, Note,
Giving States More to Stand On: Why Special Solicitude Should Not Be Necessary, 35
EcOLOGY L.Q. 385 (2008).
I's Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 548 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
'46See Mank, supra note 144, at 1730, 1756.
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states. 147 Likewise, the decision, taken alone, should not portend an
expansion of the interpretation or application of citizen-suit
provisions, or of revisiting cases like Lujan. The statute referenced in
the case was not a classic citizen-suit provision, and the majority, in
any event, did not give significant weight to the impact of the
statute. 18 In light of these factors, it seems unlikely that
Massachusetts will be extended beyond the quantitatively limited,
though qualitatively important, area of standing for states. 141
C. Congress, the Courts, and the Future of Standing
As has been suggested already, Supreme Court doctrine on the
scope of congressional power to influence standing in federal court is
not a model of clarity.'15 0 No Justice has suggested that Congress lacks
any power in this regard, and even cases like Lujan suggest that
Congress may statutorily bless injuries to provide standing where
those injuries would not have been recognized at comnmon law. But
beyond those generalities, the level of congressional authority to
authorize departures from the private rights model is not clear. Justice
Scalia (as demonstrated in his opinions)'15 '1 and Chief Justice Roberts
(as demonstrated in his law review article, and as suggested by his
opinion in Massachusetts) seem to take the most restrictive
approach-that Congress cannot tinker with the core constitutional
standing requirements, though it might relax the prudential ones.,
147 Id. at 1780-85. Which is not to say that states will now have a free ride when it comes
to standing requirements. See, e.g., Oregon v. Legal Scrvs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009)
(state lacked standing to challenge regulations issued by the Legal Services Corporation, due to
lack of particularized injury, and lack of independent quasi-independent interest that could
support patens patriae action).
148 See Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing,
Justiciability, and Separation of Powers after Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REV.
175, 190-92 (2008) [hereinafter Adler, God] (explaining that the Court relied heavily upon
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), to find that states are entitled to special
solicitude in federal courts); Tyler welti, Note, Massachusetts v. EPA's Regulatory Interest
Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 VA. L. REV. 1751, 1764-65
(2008) (explaining that the Court's holding in Massachusetts was not based in any right
conveyed in the statute, but in the states' regulatory interest as quasi-sovereign entities).
149 For these reasons, I find unpersuasive Professor Brown's arguments that the standing
analysis of Massachusetts should be applied more generally. Brown, Generalized Grievances,
supra note 144, at 224, 249. Even she concedes the importance of language in thie majority
opinion stressing the special nature of states as plaintiffs, and that the authorizing statute in the
case was not akin to a classic citizen-suit provision. Id. at 249 & n.160, 272 n.265.
150 See id. at 271 (noting the "conflicting signals" the Court has sent on these issues);
Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60
ADmIN. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (2008) (arguing that standing doctrines represent not a body of law
but an ideological struggle).
151 And in the earlier, influential article of his own, published while a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
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Other adherents to majority opinions, such as Justice Kennedy in his
concurring opinion in Lujan, suggest a broader congressional power if
embodied in a properly drafted statute. Still other majority opinions,
as in FEC v. Akins, seem to evince a more generous reading of
congressional power to influence standing.
The more restrictive aspects of current doctrine have been the
subject of a sustained critique by liberal scholars. We have already
seen one strand of that critique, which argued that Congress should be
able to statutorily authorize suits by plaintiffs who would otherwise
not satisfy the constitutional standing requirements. That argument, at
least in its broad form, was rejected in Lujan. But the critique goes
deeper. These scholars argue that not giving Congress broader power
in this regard misconceives the respective roles of the legislative and
judicial branches. Congress, the argument runs, has the constitutional
authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and a
greater competence than the federal courts to find facts; thus,
Congress should be able to determine if private enforcement of law is
necessary, as opposed to leaving it exclusively to the executive
branch.152 With respect to the argument that a broad reading of Article
III standing improperly limits executive power under Article HI, some
scholars contend that it does not give sufficient weight to the balance,
as opposed to the separation, of powers. 153 So, it is suggested,
Congress creating private enforcement might well limit presidential
power, but that is simply part of the ageless tug of war between the
two branches, one that the federal courts should play a limited role in
mediating. 154
The more restrictive aspects of current doctrine have also been
defended by conservative scholars. These scholars argue that the
creation and operation of citizen-suit provisions are driven largely by
interest-group politics. These provisions, as has been colorfully
argued, are citizen in name only since they are often brought by
environmental interest groups.' Nor is there much evidence, the
152 See YACKLE, RECLAIMING, supra note 66, at 78-79 ("Nothing in the general
conception of the separation of powers begets the intricate standing rules the Court has
developed."); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 37, 61-62 ("[Ulnless Congress attempts to grant standing to a plaintiff who
clearly has suffered no injury, separation of powers concerns counsel the Court to defer to
Congress' ability to define injuries.").
153 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 490 (2008).
154Brown, Generalized Grievances, supra note 144, at 283; Elliott, supra note 153, at
490-92.
15 Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DuKE ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 167, 171 (2001) [hereinafter Greve, Friends of the Earth]. For elaboration of the
arguments summarized in this paragraph, see, for example, Adler, God, supra note 148, at 194-
96; Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection,
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argument continues, that such suits improve environmental policy or
the environment. The main beneficiaries, financially and otherwise,
have been interest groups and their attorneys.156 In this light, it can
hardly be said that these provisions advance the public interest. The
litigating interest groups are accountable to no one, while
enforcement of federal law (or lack thereof) by the executive "will, at
least to some extent," be subject to public control and "reflect public
preferences."157 This public choice critique will resonate with the
defenders of Justice Scalia' s arguments that litigation brought under
citizen-suit provisions encroaches on the executive's Article II
powers. 15 8
The differences between the liberal and conservative critique of
doctrine regarding congressional power over standing can be
overstated. At the extremes are the positions that Congress can
always, or never, statutorily empower private parties to enforce
federal law when those parties do not satisfy constitutional standing
requirements. But there is some consensus between those positions.
For example, some of the most articulate defenders of the Lujan
decision concede that, as a constitutional matter, Congress has wide
discretion to empower private parties to enforce federal law, even if
that means contesting the President's exercise of discretion. But they
don't concede that congressional discretion is boundless, and it must
be reconciled with the Article 11 "interest in unified law
12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of
Environmental Low, 65 TUL. L. REv. 339 (1990) [hereinafter Greve, Private Enforcement];
Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1998, at 179.
156 R. Shep Melnick, Strange Bedfellows Make Normal Politics: An Essay, 9 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 75, 77 (1998).
157 Greve, Friends of the Earth, supra note 155, at 177.
158 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Ic., 528 U.S. 167, 209-
10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Greve, Private Enforcement, supra note 155). In his
article, then-Judge Scalia analogously argued that it was unnecessary and undesirable to craft
standing doctrine to permit less politically powerful groups to challenge executive decisions.
Courts are primarily intended, he argued, to protect minorities from majority oppression. If the
political branches are ignoring a social problem, then that is desired by the majority, and laws
that go unenforced are also so desired by the majority. Scalia, supra note 151, at 897; see also
Adler, God, supra note 148, at 195-97 (using this approach to argue that standing might be
justified in Hemn, since the Court is playing a countermajoritarian role in enforcing the
Establishment Clause, while it undermines Massachusetts and other environmental standing
cases, since in those cases private litigants are bypassing the political process to counter a
perceived widespread harm). Liberals have responded by arguing "that our government is not
designed to put the majority's will into operation at every turn," and that the "mere fact of
widespread harm does not lead to political mobilization." Elliott, supra note 153, at 489, 491.
See generally YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6, at 332-35 (discussing Scalia's article
and reaction to it).
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enforcement."15 9 So when structuring the enforcement of federal law,
they continue, "Congress must choose the Executive, individuals who
are injured distinctively, or some combination of both to enforce
compliance with its dictates.,,16 0 For another example, the defenders
of congressional prerogatives sometimes argue that there has not been
a flood of citizen-suit cases, and that their impact on agency
discretion has been modest.'16' Similarly, a recent empirical study has
suggested that the argument that interest groups dominate this
litigation has been overstated.162
In my view, neither the liberal nor the conservative critique has a
monopoly on correctness. Both critiques advance persuasive
arguments regarding the appropriate interaction of the first three
articles of the Constitution. The liberal critique enhances the power of
the judiciary and that of private parties empowered by Congress, at
the expense of representative government in general and of the
executive branch in particular. The conservative critique enhances the
power of the President and in theory encourages Congress to exercise
its nondelegable oversight and appropriations functions, at the
expense of giving space for the executive branch to underenforce or
violate federal law. Reasonable people can reconcile these values in
different ways, but it is difficult to denigrate these values in the first
instance. In this environment, a victory for one side is both unlikely
and inappropriate.16 3
A greater appreciation of the value of a truce is gained by
examining in greater detail how Congress has approached standing. In
this regard, Congress has rarely acted at the wholesale level. For
example, in the late 1970s, some liberal Democratic members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, not oblivious to the more restrictive
standing decisions from the first decade of the Burger Court,
introduced bills that would have granted broad standing to citizens to
enforce federal constitutional and statutory law.164 The proposed
159 Krent & Shenkman, supra note 26, at 1795.
1601d. For somewhat similar views, see woolbandler & Nelson, supra note 69, at 724-25,
who add that one can accept some limits on Congressional authority without necessarily
embracing the "more extreme views of the 'unitary executive."' Id. at 725 n. 17 1.
161 E.g., Brown, FECA Suits, supra note 34, at 713-15.
162 See Kristi M. Smith, Who's Suing Whom?: A Comparison of Government and Citizen
Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA -Administered Statutes, 1995-
2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 362 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Who's Suing] (empirical
study of such suits brought from 1995 to 2000 shows, inter alia, that "large environmental
organizations no longer domiinate the citizen suit arena").
163 Cf. Murphy, supra note 150, at 948 (calling for a comprom-ise on the restrictive and
expansive views uf stanidinig, "[als both factions in the fight both serve and undermine important
values").
114YACKLE, RECLAtMtNG, supra note 66, at 66 (discussing leadership of Senators Kennedy
and Metzenbaum on this issue).
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legislation would not have done away with constitutional standing
requirements, but would have broadly defined what an "affected
citizen" was, and how the causation requirement was to be met. 165
Hearings on the bills drew an impressive list of academics, judges,
and interest groups. Officials from the Carter administration gave
guarded support for the proposals, 166 while the lobbying arm of the
federal judiciary argued against the across-the-board nature of the
legislation, suggesting instead that, at best, statutes be incrementally
amended.16 7  In the end, none of these bills were passed, and
congressional interest in such broad-based legislation appears to have
seriously waned.
In contrast, Congress has frequently acted on a retail basis. Since
the nineteenth century, Congress has enacted scores of statutes that
create private causes of action for plaintiffs to enforce federal law
against federal or state governmental authorities, or private parties. 68
Most of these statutes do not explicitly or implicitly address standing
issues as such.'169 It was only in recent decades that Congress did so in
citizen-suit provisions, almost all of which appear in environmental
statutes.17 0 Some are also in civil rights statutes,'17'1 and some authorize
165 For detailed discussions of these proposals, see id. at 82-88; Daan Braveman, The
Standing Doctrine: A Dialogue Between the Court and Congress, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 31
(1980); Robert Allen Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals
for Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERs L. REV. 863 (1977); Harold W. Wood, Jr., Comment,
Proposed Citizens Right to Standing Act-Finding the Keys to Unlock the Courthouse Doors, 3
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231 (1979). For a critical assessment of the propriety and the
likelihood of passage of such legislation in the future, see Ann Althouse, Federal Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Federal Rights: Can Congress Bring Back the Warren Era?, 20 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1067, 1084-88 (1995).
166 See generally The Citizens' Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act of 1978: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong. 5-18 (1978)
(statement and testimony of Paul Nejelski, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of
Justice).
167 Segenerally Citizens' Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act, S. 680: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 173-82 (1979) (statement of Prof. Charles Alan
Wright on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
168 See Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation
of Powers System, 52 Amv. J. POL. Sci. 821 (2008) [hereinafter Farhang, Public Regulation]
(study of congressional enactment of private causes of action from 1887 to 2004); Judith
Resnik, Independent Federal Judiciaries: Puzzling About Why & How to Value the
Independence of Which Judges, DEDALUs, Fall 2008, at 28, 34 (stating that Congress
authorized more than 400 new federal causes of action between the 1970s and the 1990s);
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 165 n.1 I (listing 14 citizen suit provisions).
169 For example, the private causes of action that generate most private federal question
cases in federal court say little if anything about standing. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (civil
rights statute); Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
170 Brown, FECA Suits, supra note 34, at 683 & n.33.
17l E.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (Fair Housing Act of
1968); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (same).
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action against private persons or corporations, 172 in lieu of, or addition
to, those against public entities or public officials. Why has Congress
passed these statutes? The complicated mix of reasons includes
interest group lobbying, the desire to mobilize private litigants in aid
of the advancement of substantive policy goals, and skepticism that
the executive branch would enforce particular federal statutes,
especially at times of mixed party control of the presidency and
Congress.17 1 Other rationales, such as the use of these statutes as a
device to combat agencies being captured by regulated interests, have
been advanced.174  In short, there is a rich history of Congress
providing for the private enforcement of federal law, and occasionally
addressing issues of a particular plaintiff's standing.
This history suggests several conclusions that, for federal judges,
are of prudential, if not constitutional, dimension. It is not an empty
and abstract gesture to argue that federal courts should give some
level of deference to Congress statutorily addressing the standing of
potential plaintiffs in the larger context of deciding how a particular
federal law ought to be enforced. As the liberal critique suggests, the
enactment of these provisions has been in part the product of policy
battles between the legislative and executive branches. Perhaps
an enforcement scheme might be criticized as inefficient,
counterproductive, or the product of "special interest group pressure
or ... myopia," but "there is generally no constitutional dimension to
that determnation."17 5 So if Congress seems to be statutorily adopting
'72 E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Ser's. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000) (Clean Water Act).
73 Frexcellent explorations of these reasons in the context of environmental statutes, see
Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1185-95
(2009); Joseph L. Smith, Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes to Judicial
Review Under the Clean Air Act, 58 POL. RES. Q. 139 (2005); Joseph L. Smith, Judicial
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control: Congress's Strategic Use of Citizen Suits, 31
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 283 (2006) [hereinafter Smith, Judicial Procedures]. For further explorations in
the context of civil ights statutes, see Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private
Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2009).
The same reasons, and legislative inertia, no doubt explain the rarity of repeal or weakening of
citizen-suit provisions. Smith, Who's Suing, supra note 162, at 379-80. But see Dawn M.
Chutkow, Jurisdiction Stripping: Litigation, Ideology, and Congressional Control of the Courts,
70 J. POL. 1053, 1058 (2008) (study of statutes between 1943 and 2004 found that Congress
"1explicitly and regularly removes court jurisdiction ... designed to prevent court review of
administrative decision making"); Brendon Swedlow, Reason for Hope? The Spotted Owl
Injunctions and Policy Change, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 825, 840-41 (2009) (describing how
Congress amended environmental laws to blunt impact of a particular lawsuit brought by an
interest group under a citizen-suit provision).
174 See Elliott, supra note 153, at 500.
175 Ki-ent & Shenkman, supra note 26, at 1805-06 (citing Sunstein, supra note 26, at 186-
93); see also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MARING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 134-35 (2004);
Eliott, supra note 153, at 509-10. Thbis position is sometimes suggested in the cases. E.g.,
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186 (deferring to congressional judgment on what remedies will best
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the public law model of standing, whether it is wise or foolish to do
so, federal courts should give wide ambit to the application of those
statutes when confronting questions of constitutionality and
application. 176
But a wide ambit does not mean judicial abdication. The doctrinal
tools are available to provide some cabining of congressional power.
The one most readily available is Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Lujan, which suggested that carefully drawn congressional
statutes addressing standing should be upheld as constitutional.'
Such a statute addresses, at least in part, the critique of Chief Justice
Roberts that a narrower vision of standing will force Congress not to
abdicate its institutional responsibilities to engage in oversight of the
enforcement of federal law.'178 How do we know a statute meets
Justice Kennedy's test? Like any other task of statutory interpretation,
it will involve close examination of statutory text, structure, and
legislative history. 179 The task will not always be easy,' 80 but it will be
a useful starting point.18
achieve deterrence goal).
176 mien-ght analogize here to the argument that the Court's sometimes shifting and
confusing interpretation and application of jurisdictional statutes can be explained and
normatively defended as a dialogue between the three branches of government. Barry Friedman,
A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1183 (2008).
The metaphor can also be extended to the standing doctrine. Braveman, supra note 165, at 3 1.
177Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, I., concurring).
178 See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 26, at 1822-23.
179 Brown, FECA Suits, supra note 34, at 718-19; Roberts, supra note 35, at 1227.
180 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 152, at 66 n.123 (observing that in Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court was forced to focus almost exclusively on the text,
as there was little legislative history or debate on the citizen-suit provision). A recent example
of a court carefully analyzing a citizen-suit provision is Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.,
553 F.3d 979 (6th Cit. 2009). There, the court considered whether a provision of the Real Estate
Settlement Pruccdurcs Act (RESPA) uf 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006), confers standing on a
customer who is the victim of an overcharge in certain real estate transactions. Carter, 553 F.3d
at 982. The RESPA states in part that parties that violate the Act shall be liable "to the person or
persons charged for the settlement service involved in the violation in an amount equal to three
times the amount of any charge paid for such settlement service." 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2). The
court examined at length the text, legislative history, statutory purpose, and accompanying
regulations of the provision. Carter, 553 F.3d at 986-88. Then, the court concluded that
plaintiffs empowered by the provision possessed Article 111 standing, as Congress has authority
to create statutory rights, and the injury here was akin to the informational injury recognized by
the Supreme Court in similar contexts. Id. at 989 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 373 (1982)). Thus, the plaintiffs had standing, even though they did "not allege an
above-market rate charge for services, i.e. an 'overcharge."' Id. at 982.
1811I am not arguing in favor of a purely positivist approach to standing, which by some
accounts would rely, apparently exclusively, on whether the statute explicitly provides that a
citizen (or any other plaintiff, like a state) can sue. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 616-17
(1999) ("[Tlhe question of standing is for congressional rather than judicial resolution."); Welti,
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On this account, some of the previously discussed cases fare better
than others, where Congress has statutorily addressed standing, and
where standing is otherwise problematic. For example, Lujan and
Akins seem more reconcilable than thought by some scholars, given
that the citizen-suit statute in the latter case had different language
and a richer jurisprudential meaning giving context to the operative
language. 12On the other hand, Flast and Massachusetts are more
problematic. As indicated above, in the statute under attack in Flast,
Congress declined the opportunity to grant taxpayer standing. That
alone calls the correctness of the decision into serious question, on a
view that gives serious (though not dispositive) weight to
congressional judgments on the propriety of standing. Likewise, the
failure of the statute in Massachusetts to specifically mention
standing issues, much less the standing of states,' makes the
decision more difficult to defend.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF STANDING IN THE ROBERTS COURT
Writing in 1993, John Roberts seemed sanguine about the state of
standing in the post -Lujan world. For example, he argued that
standing is an "apolitical limitation on judicial power," and its
restrictions will affect both liberal and conservative interest groups.18
This showed admirable evenhandedness on his own part, since the
conventional wisdom holds that usually Congress has drafted
citizen-suit provisions, at least in part, to aid pro-regulatory, typically
liberal interest groups, 15and tasuch groups, for the most part, have
supra note 148, at 1783-84 (presenting this view in context of critical analysis of
Massachusetts).
182 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. It also cannot go unnoticed that Justice
Kennedy concurred in both cases, and even Justice Scalia, dissenting in Akins, did not argue that
the majority was overruling Lujan. In the Court's recent decision in Summers v. Earth Island
Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009), the five-Justice majority (per Scalia, J.) held that
environmental organizations and their members lacked standing to challenge certain Forest
Service regulations, given the lack of an imminent injury. In a brief concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy noted that the statute did not indicate that "Congress intended to identify or confer
some interest separate and apart from a procedural ight." Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83 Msahstsv. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535-38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
184Roberts, supra note 35, at 1230.
185 See STEVEN M. TELEs, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 53 (2008) (discussing how a more liberal Congress, with
subcommittees staffed by young liberal lawyers, began to loosen standing rules after the
breakdown of conservative power in Congress in the early 1970s); Smith, Judicial Procedures,
supra note 173, at 299 (using statistical analysis to examine the correlation between the
likelihood of a citizen-suit provision emerging from a committee and that committee's
ideology). But see Farhang, Public Regulation, supra note 168, at 830 (documenting instances
of Republican-controlled Congresses enacting private causes of action in favor of businesses
and conservative groups).
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been the principal, though not exclusive, beneficiaries of such
provisions. 186 Roberts also suggested that Congress is capable of
carefully drafting such provisions, in ways that would satisfy a Lujan-
like inquiry, 8 and further wondered how difficult it really was for
interest groups to submit affidavits with specific indication of how
they were or would be affected by government action. 88'
Much has occurred in the standing arena since 1993, and the
advent of the Obama presidency may present new challenges on that
front to the Roberts Court. At the time of this writing, it is widely
assumed that President Barack Obama, with Democratic majorities in
Congress, will embark on new regulatory efforts on various fronts. If
so, it might seem that private litigants, through citizen-suit provisions,
might be mobilized to support such new regulation. On the other
hand, a unified government might find it less necessary or even
suboptimal to engage in such mobilization. 19In any event, on the
near horizon are likely further challenges to the qui tam statute,190 and
to the use of generalized grievances in climate change and other
environmental cases.' 9' Congress could statutorily address and
18hConservative interest groups have of course also challenged federal and state action in a
variety of contexts. See generally TELES, supra note 185; Ann Southworth, Conservative
Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of "Public Interest Law," 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223
(2005). Such lawsuits can take advantage of flexible standing doctrines, like their liberal
counterparts. For one recent example, see Murray v. Geithner, 624 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Mich.
2009) (holding that federal taxpayer and Iraq War veteran, represented by Thomas More Law
Center, had standing as a taxpayer to challenge on Establishment Clause grounds purported
spending under the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008 for Islamic religious activities).
87 Roberts, supra note 35, at 1227 & n.52 (observing that, in contrast to the citizen-suit
provision at issue in Lajan, the provision in the Clean Water Act defines ..'citizen"'. as limited to
"'persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected"'. (quoting 33 U.S.C. §
1365(g) (1988))).
188 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
189 See Farhang, Public Regulation, supra note 168, at 834-36 (study of creation of
private rights of action from 1887 to 2004 showed, among other things, that such enactments
were more likely with Democratic majorities in Congress, but also more likely when there was
divided government).
190 The Court in Stevens rejected an Article Ill challenge to the statute, but left open future
consideration of Article II challenges. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. It is not
entirely clear that the latter challenge could be divorced entirely from the Article III question,
though Stevens seemed to do that. The possibility of executive intervention in private actions
under the qui tam statute arguably informs the resolution of both the Article 11 and Article III
issues. YAcKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 6, at 335 n. 174; Krent & Shenkman, supra note
26, at 1820-21 ("In the absence of executive supervision, private relators may readily
manipulate qui tam suits to benefit themselves financially at the public's expense.").
191 For discussions of the standing issues in cases percolating in the lower federal courts
raising this issue, see generally Brown, Generalized Grievances, supra note 144; Elliott, supra
note 153; Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391 (2009): Bradford C. Mank. Standing and Statistical Persons: A
Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLoGY L.Q. 665 (2009); see also Richard J. L.azarus,
Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1231 (2009) ("Citizen-suit provisions will likely need to play a
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potentially shape or moot the judicial resolution of some of these
issues. 192
similarly important function in climate change legislation to guard against anticipated Executive
Branch hesitance."). The Court has begun to address these issues. See Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (rejecting argument that organizational standing can be
based on a "statistical probability that some of those members are threatened with concrete
injury").
192For provocative suggestions, see Preston Carter, Note, "If an (Endangered) Tree Falls
in the Forest, and No One is Around. :Resolving the Divergence Between Standing
Requirements and Congressional intent In Environmental Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2191 (2009) (discussing whether Congress should create Article I forums to hear citizen suits
under environmental laws, or grant environmental groups the right to enforce such laws);
Timothy C. Hodits, Note, The Fatal Flaw of Standing: A Proposal for an Article I Tribunal for
Environmental Claims, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1907 (2006) (arguing for the use of Article I
tribunals to resolve environmental claims). Congress sometimes addresses standing issues
outside the regulatory arena as such. For example, Congress sometimes provides for special
procedures for anticipated legal challenges when passing substantive legislation. See Michael E.
Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the
Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 772-73 (2007) (discussing provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) that provided that members of Congress had standing
to challenge the law on constitutional grounds).
In a more recent example, Congress passed legislation late in 2008 that retroactively
lowers a previously enacted salary increase for the Secretary of State. Act of Dec. 19, 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-455, 122 Stat. 5036. The legislation was intended to permit Senator Hillary
Clinton to serve as the Secretary of State in the Obama adinistration. Opinion of Office of
Legal Counsel, Validity of Statutory Rollbacks As a Means of Complying with the Ineligibility
Clause 13 (2009) (authored by David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel), available at www.justice.gov/olc/2009/ineligibility-clause.pdf. She had
previously voted as a Senator to increase the salary of the Secretary, and her subsequent service
in that position would arguably be a violation of the Emoluments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
6, cl. 2, absent the subsequent salary diminution. For discussion of the substantive issue, see
John F. O'Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist
Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 89 (1995). The 2008 legislation states that "[a]ny person
aggrieved by an action of the Secretary of State may bring a civil action" before a three-judge
district court in the District of Columbia to challenge her appointment. Act of Dec. 19, 2008, §
I(b)(l)-(2). This citizen-suit provision likely passes constitutional muster under the opinions in
Lujan and Akins, since it does define the sort of person who can bring suit and links it to an
injury of some sort inflicted by the Secretary of State. Absent that provision, it would secm any
potential challenger to Clinton's appointment would be denied standing on the grounds that it
would be nothing more than a mere generalized grievance. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd
Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 907, 916-17 (1994) (discussing standing issues
raised by similar legislation passed when Senator Lloyd Bentsen was nominated to be Secretary
of the Treasury). Perhaps more interesting is why the provision was included at all. Some
legislators may have felt that there were genuine constitutional issues raised, and wished to pass
them off to the judicial branch. They may have wanted to route the inevitable suit or suits into
one forum. Or, perhaps it was due to an explicit or implicit legislative deal that enabled the
legislation to pass. A suit filed under this provision was dismissed as this article went to press:
Rodearmel v. Clinton, No. l:09-cv-00171, 2009 WL 3486634 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2009) (three-
judge district court) (per curiam). The plaintiff was a Foreign Service Officer of the State
Department, who argued that Secretary Clinton's allegedly unconstitutional appointment injured
him by making him violate his oath of office. Id. at *4-... The court dismissed the case on
standing grounds. It found that the plaintiff was not an "aggrieved person" under the statute,
since he had not alleged that Clinton had taken action that had aggrieved him, and, hence, he
lacked "prudential standing." Id. at *3. Nor did the alleged violation of his oath supply standing
under Art. M. Id. at *4-...
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Whether or not Congress so acts in the coming years, I do not
foresee sharp departures from current standing doctrine on the current
Supreme Court. Hein is the paradigmatic case. When faced with the
opportunity to drastically change the law of standing, a majority of
the Justices demurred, but the result was to further narrow the
application of an old precedent that had liberalized standing
requirements. This sort of incremental move, intellectually
dissatisfying to academics (and others) to be sure, will probably
characterize the standing jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, whether
rulings are in favor of plaintiffs or defendants. An alternative scenario
on standing would view the Justices in conventionally ideological
terms, with liberals (usually) voting to grant standing, and
conservatives (usually) voting to deny standing.19 3 Massachusetts and
Sprint can be considered the paradigm cases for that view. The past is
prologue, but the past is murky when it comes to standing in the
Roberts Court.
193 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Supreme Court's Standing Problem, ENGAGE: J.
FEDERAI1ST Sot"', PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 2008, at 4, 4-5 (stating that the Court has shifted
towards the "standing skeptics" since Roberts and Alito joined); Murphy, supra note 150, at
946-48 (noting that the reliably conservative Justices favor a stricter standing doctrine while the
more liberal Justices prefer a more permissive approach).
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